INTRODUCTION
Increased demand for corporate environmentalism has created a need for companies to communicate their ability to manage environmental risks and impacts to a broad range of stakeholders. A recent global survey of over 4,000 large companies indicated that 71 percent issued a corporate responsibility report in 2013 (KPMG, 2013) . But the survey authors concluded that these reports "are often not that easy to read" and advised companies "to communicate the information in a more digestible and engaging way" (KPMG, 2013: 9) . One 2 way companies can bridge this information asymmetry is to use a signal: an action that succinctly conveys information that may be too complex to convey directly (Spence, 1973) .
Studies based on signaling theory have demonstrated that several self-regulatory programs that require third-party certification are credible indicators of a firm's environmental capabilities (King, Lenox, and Terlaak, 2005; Montiel, Husted, and Christmann, 2012; Potoski and Prakash, 2005; Rivera, 2002) . Such programs serve as credible signals when meeting their standards is sufficiently more costly for companies with inferior management capabilities such that they forego participating (Darnall and Carmin, 2005; Darnall and Edwards, 2006; Terlaak, 2007) . Programs featuring third-party certification impose two types of costs on participants: (1) the managerial effort, technology, and equipment required meet the program's standards, and (2) a fee paid to a third-party auditor to attest that the standards have been met. The audit fee, which can be tens of thousands of dollars, is unrelated to a firm's environmental capabilities, degrades the program's signaling value if it deters participation by firms that could readily meet the requirements but choose to avoid incurring the fee. 1 In this paper, we examine a different type of self-regulatory program that encourages scrutiny from civil society by requiring participants to publicly commit to the program's goals and principles. The ability of these programs to serve as signals does not rely on participants paying for third-party certification, but on monitoring and sanctions provided by civil society.
We propose that civil society scrutiny holds participants accountable to the program's goals by exposing them to the risk of reputation damage if they fall short of their commitments. The higher cost that lower-capability firms face to meet such commitments increases the risk that they will fall short, and the resulting heightened risk of reputational damage deters their 3 participation. Because meeting such commitments is more costly (in expectation) for lowercapability firms, they are less and therefore deters their participation. Herein lies the signaling credibility of such programs.
We hypothesize that two institutional factors and one organizational attribute will contribute to this effect. First, we hypothesize that institutional environments more likely to impose civil society scrutiny will be more effective in deterring firms with inferior capabilities from participating in self-regulatory programs. Second, we hypothesize that institutional environments with greater expectations for corporate socially responsible behavior-and therefore the threat of worse consequences for failing to meet those expectations-will also be especially effective in deterring companies with inferior capabilities from participating. Third, we hypothesize that smaller companies with inferior capabilities will be more deterred from participating than larger companies with inferior capabilities. This results from the heightened scrutiny that participation elicits having a greater impact on smaller firms, larger firms being already more visible and exposed to scrutiny. We test our theory by empirically analyzing companies' decisions whether or not to join the United Nations (UN) Global Compact, a self-regulatory program that espouses a set of environmental and social principles that participants pledge to uphold, but that eschews thirdparty certification that could attest that they actually do. The Global Compact imposes no direct costs of joining. Instead, its secretariat publicizes the names of participating companies and their annual progress reports, which invites civil society scrutiny (UN Global Compact, 2015a) .
To study whether Global Compact participation can serve as a credible signal of a company's capability to manage environmental risks and impacts, we examine the conditions under which companies with higher-quality environmental disclosures-that is, disclosures that 4 reveal more quantitative information on the company's most meaningful environmental risks and impacts-are more likely to participate. Quantitative disclosures are a compelling measure of environmental capabilities because prior research has shown that companies that issue highquality environmental disclosures have superior environmental performance (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, and Hughes, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008) and are able to better manage environmental risks (Blacconiere and Northcut, 1997; Blacconiere and Patten, 1994) . 2 Using a sample of 2,604 companies (with headquarters in 44 countries), we find evidence to support our three hypotheses. We find that companies with lower-quality disclosures are particularly deterred from participating in the Global Compact in institutional settings in which (a) the risk of civil society scrutiny is greater, and (b) the expectations for corporate socially responsible behavior are higher. Finally, we find that smaller companies with lower-quality disclosures are more deterred than larger companies with comparably low-quality disclosures.
After presenting our theory, analysis, and results, we conclude by discussing our study's implications for scholarship on signaling theory and self-regulation.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Firms know more about their capabilities than do their external stakeholders. This information asymmetry creates a transaction cost of identifying companies with desirable characteristics (Akerlof, 1970; Williamson, 1985) . Thus, it is in the best interest of firms with characteristics that are desirable to their stakeholders to reduce information asymmetries by sending a signalan action that succinctly conveys information that may be too complex to convey directly 5 (Spence, 1973) . A signal will be credible if firms with inferior management capabilities find the costs of sending the signal to exceed the benefits, whereas firms with superior management capabilities find the benefits to exceed the costs. Several studies have examined how self-regulatory programs that require third-party certification can credibly signal superior capabilities to manage quality, health and safety, or environmental issues (Anderson, Daly, and Johnson, 1999; King, Lenox, and Terlaak, 2005; Levine and Toffel, 2010; Potoski and Prakash, 2005) . These papers theorize that firms with inferior management capabilities will forgo participation because the costs of implementing the policies and procedures required to pass the certification audit exceed the anticipated benefits. In contrast, firms with superior management capabilities will participate because the anticipated benefits of meeting the program's requirements exceed the costs (Terlaak, 2007) . Some have argued that self-regulatory programs that lack third-party auditing requirements cannot be credible signals as they allow for free-riding because it would be no costlier for firms with inferior capabilities to join than for firms with superior capabilities (Darnall and Carmin, 2005; Lenox and Nash, 2003) . Others have argued that it is too costly for external stakeholders to scrutinize the participants to prevent such free-riding (Montiel, Husted, and Christmann, 2012) .
We note, however, that some self-regulatory programs promote scrutiny from civil society actors by requiring participants to publicly commit to the program's principles. Programs such as the chemical industry's Responsible Care, the ski industry's Sustainable Slopes, the United Nations Global Compact (the focus of this study), and the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) WasteWise programs do not require third-party certification, but do require participants to commit to their principles and publish participants' names on their websites.
However, previous studies have not found evidence that participation in such programs can serve 6 as a credible signal (Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2010; King and Lenox, 2000; Rivera and de Leon, 2004; Rivera, de Leon, and Koerber, 2006) . In contrast to this prior work, we explore whether or how a company's institutional or organizational context might influence the perceived likelihood or consequences of civil society scrutiny in such a way that participation might indeed serve as a credible signal.
We propose that scrutiny from civil society actors can, under certain conditions, impose a higher cost of participation in self-regulatory programs featuring scrutiny from civil society for firms with inferior capabilities, so that participation does serve as a credible signal. Our work thus addresses Connelly et al.'s (2011: 61) call for research on how penalties inflicted by third parties for sending "false signals" might act as a substitute for more formal signaling costs, such as those imposed by third-party certification auditors.
By identifying how organizational and institutional factors interact to influence participation in a self-regulatory program, our work builds on prior research that has examined other organizational and institutional factors that influence participation. For example, others have found that participation is more prevalent among firms that are larger (e.g., Arora and Cason, 1996) , more export-oriented Taylor, 2001, 2006; King, Lenox, and Terlaak, 2005) , and that spend more on R&D (Terlaak and King, 2006) . Research has found that institutional features such as regulatory scrutiny (Rivera, 2002) and corruption also influence firms' propensity to participate in self-regulatory programs (Montiel, Husted, and Christmann, 2012) . We theorize that institutional and organizational factors can impose differentially greater costs on companies with inferior capabilities such that participation in a self-regulatory program featuring civil society scrutiny-but not third-party certification-can serve as a credible signal.
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The critical role of civil society scrutiny For firms, as for individuals, the decision to signal information to uninformed parties hinges on the perceived costs and benefits of that action. The benefits of signaling superior environmental capabilities are the additional profits the company expects once its superior capabilities are known in the marketplace. These profits may come from new business generated from buyers with environmental preferences (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995) , reduced environmental oversight from regulators in the form of shorter permitting delays (Decker, 2003) and fewer inspections (Toffel and Short, 2011) , or from the company's ability to attract more highly motivated employees (Brekke and Nyborg, 2008) .
Some have argued that self-regulatory programs that lack third-party certification requirements risk allowing firms to receive such benefits without being held accountable for their commitments (Darnall and Carmin, 2005; Delmas and Montes-Sancho, 2010; King and Lenox, 2000) . However, firms that participate in a self-regulatory program that instead features scrutiny from civil society risk being criticized if such scrutiny reveals their failure to uphold their commitments. For example, Greenpeace criticized Dow Chemical, a Responsible Care participant, for lobbying to raise the legal allowance of a pollutant, dioxin, instead of reducing its use. Greenpeace noted that this lobbying effort was in direct contrast to its alleged Responsible Care commitment "to lead in the development of responsible laws, regulations and standards that safeguard the community, workplace and environment." In line with this logic, researchers have argued that the threat of such criticism from civil society might actually cause firms to "clam up" (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011: 21) and dissuade them from publicly committing to making environmental improvements (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Bowen, 2014) .
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Studies examining the impacts of social movements have shown that such negative press resulting from civil society scrutiny can impose costly reputational damage (e.g., Bartley and Child, 2011; King and Soule, 2007) . However, even when no lasting reputational damage occurs, such exposure is likely to negate the benefits of participation because it can make the firm's participation seem merely symbolic. For example, the Business and Human Rights Centre, which maintains a database of articles regarding corporate human rights abuses, also lists whether the company in question is a participant in the UN Global Compact. It is less likely that participants exposed as symbolic participants will benefit from their membership in the program, especially given the public's growing skepticism of symbolic environmental commitments, sometimes referred to as greenwash (Lyon and Montgomery, 2015) .
Because it is more costly for firms with inferior capabilities than for firms with superior capabilities to uphold the program's public commitments, we posit that when the probability of being caught by civil society is sufficient, participation in a self-regulatory program featuring scrutiny can serve as a signal. Clearly, however, the credibility of the signal will depend on the extent to which a participant's institutional context supports civil society oversight. A firm's decision to join a self-regulatory program featuring scrutiny from civil society will depend not only on the likelihood that scrutiny will result in sanctions, but also on the 9 impact of those sanctions. This impact will vary with the extent to which stakeholders expect firms to behave in a socially responsible manner, which varies considerably across countries (e.g., Chapple and Moon, 2005; Doh and Guay, 2006; Matten and Moon, 2008) . Firms headquartered in institutional contexts that have greater expectations for socially responsible behavior are held to higher standards (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003) and face greater punishments if they fall short (Campbell, 2007; Peloza and Papania, 2008) . Thus, firms in such contexts that fail to uphold their commitment to a self-regulatory program's objectives are at greater risk of provoking negative attention. We propose that firms with inferior capabilities to manage their environmental risks and impacts will be especially deterred from participating in a program featuring scrutiny from civil society when they face these heightened expectations. We therefore predict that participation in such a program will serve as a more credible signal amongst firms in this institutional context. In addition to a firm's institutional context, organizational characteristics can also affect its perceived costs of participating in a self-regulatory program featuring civil society scrutiny.
H2
We propose that because the public is less likely to have strong opinions about smaller firms (Fombrun, Gardberg, and Barnett, 2000) , any new information regarding corporate behavior will likely have a greater reputational impact for a smaller firm than it would have for a larger firm.
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The potential cost is less likely to be meaningful for larger firms since they are already more visible to their stakeholders and tend to attract more scrutiny than smaller firms (Greening and Gray, 1994; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978; Scott, 1992) . Among smaller firms, those with inferior capabilities, or those that would find upholding the program's commitments more difficult, will be less keen to invite the spotlight of stakeholder scrutiny. We therefore predict that smaller firms with inferior capabilities will be especially deterred from participating.
H3: Firms with inferior capabilities to manage their environmental risks and impacts will
be less likely to participate in a self-regulatory program featuring scrutiny from civil society when they are smaller.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Empirical context
To test our hypotheses, we examined participation in the United Nations Global Compact, a selfregulatory program that has a set of environmental and social standards that participants publicly pledge to uphold, but that lacks an auditing requirement to ensure that they do. The Global Compact requires two things of a participant: it must issue a "commitment letter" publicly declaring its support for the 10 Global Compact principles on environmental and social issues 6 and it must commit to submitting an annual public report on its progress in implementing the principles, with the first report due one year after the company joins the Global Compact. Unlike programs that require third-party certification, there are no mandatory fees or certification costs required to participate in the Global Compact. Instead, it publicizes a member's participation and progress reports, which encourages monitoring from external stakeholders such as NGOs.
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These minimal requirements have raised concerns that the Global Compact has allowed some firms to participate that are not truly committed to its principles and do not intend to implement them (Bigge, 2004; Deva, 2006; Lim and Tsutsui, 2012; Nolan, 2005; Waddock and McIntosh, 2011) . However, NGOs do monitor Global Compact participants and speak up when they perceive firms to not be adhering to the principles. For example, SOMO 7 -a self-described corporate watchdog-maintains the "Global Compact Critics" blog, which publicly shames participants that fall short of their commitments. The Global Compact also allows NGOs to participate, both to work with the business participants and to hold them accountable to their commitments by voicing concerns when they find that participants are not abiding by the principles (Rasche, 2009: 520 Jones STOXX Europe 600, FTSE All Share, MSCI Asia ex Japan, MSCI World, Nikkei 225, Russell 1000, and S&P 500. We omit from our sample companies in industries for which direct environmental impacts are typically inconsequential, as others have done (e.g., Cho and Patten, 2007; Clarkson et al., 2008) . In particular, we omit the 1,901 companies in service-related industries and focus on the remaining 2,918 companies that are in manufacturing, resources, and other industries listed in Table 1 . companies that had joined before our sample period and that we therefore omitted.
Linking the remaining 2,799 companies to our other data sources-the United Nations, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, the World Values Survey, Worldscope, and the Yearbook of International Organizations-resulted in a loss of 195 more companies. In sum, restricting our sample to the firms within the Trucost universe that were in industrial-related industries, had not joined the Global Compact before 2004, and were linked to our other data sources yielded an estimation sample of 2,604 companies headquartered in 44 countries.
13 Tables 1 and 2 report the industry and headquarter country distributions of the estimation sample.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here]
Variables
We measure Global Compact participation as an annual binary variable coded 1 the year a company initially participated in the Global Compact and 0 otherwise.
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For nonparticipants, it is always coded 0. We obtained a comprehensive list of all companies that participated in the Global Compact, including the date they began participating, from the Global Compact secretariat.
To proxy for a company's capabilities to manage its environmental risks and impacts, we rely on the quality of its environmental disclosures. Research has shown that companies that issue higher-quality environmental disclosures are better able to manage environmental risks (Blacconiere and Northcut, 1997; Blacconiere and Patten, 1994) and have lower environmental impacts (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, and Hughes, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008) . Our use of this proxy is consistent with the accounting literature's discretionary disclosure theory, which posits that companies with superior environmental capabilities will disclose objective information regarding their environmental impacts to convey those capabilities to stakeholders (Dye, 1985; Verrecchia, 1983) . Because it is difficult for companies with inferior capabilities to reveal equally positive information, stakeholders can use disclosures as an indicator of a company's environmental capabilities.
We measure quality of environmental disclosure by relying on Trucost's weighted disclosure ratio (Trucost Plc, 2008) . This ratio is the proportion of a company's relevant Second, Trucost reviewed each company's annual reports, sustainability reports, and websites to determine for which of the relevant indicators the company publicly disclosed quantitative figures. To appropriately weight these disclosures, Trucost multiplied each indicator by a damage cost factor; for example, $31 per ton of greenhouse gas emitted. Trucost obtains these damage cost factors from the environmental economics literature. The sum of these products is the numerator of the weighted disclosure ratio.
To construct the denominator, Trucost estimated the environmental damage that would have been reported had the company made a complete disclosure; the denominator of the weighted disclosure ratio is therefore also referred to as the company's environmental damage.
To do so, Trucost estimated the relevant indicators which the company did not disclose, based on economic input-output data and lifecycle assessment data from various sources. It multiplied each of those indicators by its damage cost factor and added the sum of those products to the numerator. The weighted disclosure ratio captures the extent to which a company disclosed its more environmentally damaging or less environmentally damaging indicators.
We measured civil society scrutiny as the number of global NGOs in a company's headquarters country that were participants in the Global Compact in a given year, or NGO participants. According to the Global Compact, global NGOs are nonprofit entities that pursue positive social and environmental changes both within and beyond their country's borders. The role of global NGO participants is to hold business participants accountable to their commitments to implement the Global Compact's principles (UN Global Compact, 2015b We measured stakeholder expectations of responsible behavior, or ethical context, based on data from the World Economic Forum's annual Executive Opinion Survey, which is a part of the World Competitiveness Report. Data from these surveys have been used by many other scholars examining international datasets (e.g., Aggarwal and Goodell, 2014; Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobatón, 1998; van Stel, Carree, and Thurik, 2005; Yuan, Low, and Tang, environmental disclosure would be 0.1. If those 10 disclosed indicators instead collectively represented 90% of the company's overall environmental damage, then its quality of environmental disclosure would be a much more impressive 0.9. 14 We focus on NGOs in each company's headquarters country because is it easier for NGOs to research companies that operate (and release information) in the same language and because NGOs can more easily educate the local community and engage with the local regulators (Billings, 1971; Sine and Lee, 2009) . The Appendix describes a robustness test that uses Internet usage as an alternative measure of civil society scrutiny, based on the premise that greater Internet penetration increases the threat of scrutiny from NGOs based domestically or elsewhere. Our regression estimates based on this alternative measure yield the same inferences that our primary model do. 15 As a robustness test, we also run our regressions with the number of NGO participants in the Global Compact as a percentage of the total number of NGOs in that country. The total number of NGOs is gathered from the Yearbook of International Organizations. The results in Model 2 remain largely similar in terms of effect sizes and significance levels. In Model 3, however, the interaction between the percentage of NGOs in the Global Compact and the quality of environmental disclosure becomes significant only at the 10% level (p=0.074).
2010).
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Business leaders were asked, "In your country, how would you rate the corporate ethics of companies (ethical behavior in interactions with public officials, politicians, and other firms)?" Responses ranged from 1 ("extremely poor-among the worst in the world") to 7
("excellent-among the best in the world"). This question was not asked in the [2003] [2004] [2005] surveys, which prevents us from using annual figures. Instead, we use average country values based on surveys conducted in 2006-2008. 17 We assign these country average values to companies based on their headquarters location. A company's key stakeholders-including employees, regulators, and investors-tend to be concentrated in its headquarters country, which makes this institutional environment especially influential (Guler, Guillén, and Macpherson 2002) . 18 We measure company size using its annual sales, a common approach to capture a company's visibility to its stakeholders (e.g., Cho and Patten, 2007; Elsayed and Hoque, 2010; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Patten, 2002) . We measure sales in millions of U.S. dollars based on data from Worldscope and we standardize sales by country to account for the fact that the mean and variation in company sales differ substantially by country.
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To adjust for outliers within each country, we winsorize at the 99th percentile.
We measure the extent to which a company's activities result in environmental damage using the previously described metric provided by Trucost, which is reported in millions of U.S. dollars. As with sales, we standardize environmental damage by country to account for the fact that the mean and variation of environmental damage differs substantially by country. We also winsorize at the 99th percentile to account for outliers within each country.
We created two variables based on data from the Business and Human Rights Research Centre's (BHRRC) library of global news articles about companies and human rights. Each article in this database, which is freely available on the organization's website (http://businesshumanrights.org/), contains a summary of its content as well as BHRRC's tags, which include the companies named and the specific human rights issues discussed. We measure the extent to which a company's activities result in any human rights concerns based on whether the company had been tagged in any article in the BHRRC database in a given year that contained an "abuse" tag such as beatings and violence, denial of freedom of association, and sexual harassment. 20 We likewise coded any labor rights concerns based on whether the BHRRC database contained an article in a given year that tagged a company's name and either a "labor condition" issue such as child labor or forced labor or a "discrimination" issue such as pregnancy or racial/ethical/caste origin.
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Because only four percent of the companies in our sample were tagged in more than one such article, we measure any human rights concerns and any labor rights concerns as dummy variables at the company-year level rather than as counts, in order to avoid undue influence of outliers, which is akin to top-coding at the 96th percentile.
We calculated peer participation for each company as the number of companies sharing its headquarters country and industry classification (that is, Industry Classification Benchmark
[ICB] supersector) that were already participating in the Global Compact the prior year. We also include several country-level variables. We measure the annual total number of NGOs in a company's headquarters country based on data from the annual Yearbook of International Organizations. (Greene, 2007: 62; Maddala, 1977: 202) . Our results are nearly identical when, as a robustness test, we estimate our models on the slightly smaller sample that excludes the 330 company-year observations from the 102 companies in these four countries. 25 The ISO Surveys can be found at http://www.iso.org/iso/survey2005.pdf and http://www.iso.org/iso/survey2007.pdf. Accessed May 2015.
company's headquarters country, or GDP per capita, as its gross domestic product (GDP) per thousand people based on annual data from the World Bank.
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Summary statistics and correlations are reported in Table 3 .
[Insert Table 3 about here]
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS
Specification
We estimate the following model: (Berliner and Prakash, 2012) . This term also includes GDP per capita because a company whose headquarters country is wealthier might benefit less from participating in the Global Compact.
The term X5 refers to our time-invariant country-level measure of UN support. We control for this because the value of Global Compact participation might be greater in countries that are more supportive of the United Nations (Berliner and Prakash, 2012) , where the program might be more recognizable and where stakeholders might view membership more favorably (Bennie, Bernhagen, and Mitchell, 2007) .
The term represents industry dummies (ICB supersector) to control for time-invariant industry differences in the propensity to participate in the Global Compact. Year dummies ( ) control for overall temporal trends that might affect participation, such as the Global Compact becoming more recognizable over time. Finally, the term , , , represents the error term.
Results
Like other studies that have tested signaling models (e.g., King and Lenox, 2000; Lenox and Nash, 2003; Montiel, Husted, and Christmann, 2012) , we use logistic regression to predict the likelihood that a company will decide to take the signaling action of participating in the Global
Compact. We lag all independent variables, moderators, and control variables by one year to avoid reverse-causality concerns.
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To ease interpretation, all interacted variables are standardized and sales and environmental damage are standardized by country, as noted above.
Because our explanatory variables are measured at the company or country level, we report standard errors clustered by country (Petersen, 2009) . Our diagnostic check for multicollinearity yielded no cause for concern, as the maximum variance inflation factor was 5.1, well below the conventional threshold of 10 (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980) .
Regression results are reported in Table 4 , both as coefficients and as average marginal 
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Our model predicts that when companies face low civil society scrutiny, the probability of participating in the Global Compact approximately doubles when comparing companies with no environmental disclosures to those with very high-quality disclosure. That is, estimates based on setting NGO participants at the 5th percentile of the sample distribution indicate that the predicted probability of participation increases from 1.9 to 4.2 percent (a factor of 2.2) as quality of environmental disclosure increases from the 5th to the 95 th percentile of our sample distribution. In contrast, the corresponding increase when companies face high civil society scrutiny is nearly fourfold. That is, estimates based on setting NGO participants at the 95th percentile indicate that the predicted probability of participation increases from 0.8 to 3.0 percent (a factor of 3.8). The greater increase in the predicted probability of participation when calculated as if the companies were headquartered in countries with strong civil society scrutiny suggests that participation provides a more credible signal in such countries.
Model 3 includes the interaction between quality of environmental disclosure and ethical context. The significant positive coefficient on this interaction term (β = 0.10; p < 0.05) indicates that companies with lower-quality disclosures are especially unlikely to participate when headquartered in countries with greater expectations for corporate ethical behavior. This supports H2. Figure 2 depicts the average predicted probability of participating in the Global Compact along varying levels of quality of environmental disclosure and as if the companies were headquartered in countries with weak and strong ethical contexts; that is, at the 5th or 95th
percentile of the sample distribution of ethical context.
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The nearly flat solid line in Figure 2 indicates that for companies headquartered in countries with very weak ethical contexts, the data reveal little relationship between quality of environmental disclosure and the average predicted probability of participating. Our model predicts that when companies are headquartered in countries with weak ethical contexts, the probability of a company with very high-quality disclosure participating in the Global Compact is only 1.15 times the probability for a company making no environmental disclosures. That is, estimates based on setting ethical context at the 5th percentile of the sample distribution indicate that the predicted probability of participation increases from 3.3 to 3.8 percent (a factor of 1.15) as quality of environmental disclosure increases from the 5th to the 95th percentile. In contrast, the corresponding increase when companies face high civil society scrutiny is fourfold. That is, estimates based on setting ethical context at the 95th percentile of the sample distribution indicate that the predicted probability of participation increases from 0.8 to 3.2 percent (a factor of 4.0) as quality of environmental disclosure increases from the 5th to the 95th percentile. The greater increase in the predicted 30 The dashed line refers to estimates as if the companies were all headquartered in a country whose ethical context was at the 95th percentile of our sample, such as Denmark, Finland, or New Zealand. The solid line refers to average predicted values estimated as if the companies were all headquartered in a country whose ethical context was at the fifth percentile of our sample distribution, such as in Argentina, Indonesia, the Philippines, or Russia. 24 probability of participation when calculated as if the companies were headquartered in countries with a strong ethical context suggests that participation provides a more credible signal in these countries.
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here]
Model 4 includes the interaction between quality of environmental disclosure and sales.
The negative significant coefficient on this interaction term (β = -0.09; p = 0. 08) indicates that companies with low quality of environmental disclosure are especially deterred from participation in the Global Compact when they are less visible, which weakly supports H3. This relationship is depicted in Figure 3 . The increasing slope of both lines indicates a greater propensity to participate in the Global Compact among companies with higher-quality environmental disclosures. The solid line's steeper slope indicates that this positive relationship is more intensive for smaller companies-those at the 5th percentile of our sample distribution.
Our model predicts that when companies are larger, the probability of a company with very highquality disclosure participating in the Global Compact is twice that of a company with no environmental disclosures. That is, estimates based on setting sales at the 95th percentile indicate that the predicted probability of participation increases from 2.4 to 4.8 percent (a factor of 2.0) as quality of environmental disclosure increases from the 5th to the 95th percentile. In contrast, the corresponding increase for smaller companies more than triples. That is, estimates based on setting sales at the 5th percentile of the sample distribution indicate that the predicted probability of participation increases from 0.9 to 3.1 percent (a factor of 3.4). The greater increase in the predicted probability of participation when calculated as if the companies are smaller suggests that participation among these companies provides a more credible signal.
DISCUSSION
Our analysis reveals that self-regulatory programs lacking certification can sometimes serve as credible signals by promoting civil society scrutiny of the participants. Below, we discuss how our study contributes to the literature, provide implications for managers, acknowledge limitations of our study, and offer suggestions for future research.
Contributions
The central contribution of our work is to the literature that examines whether participation in a self-regulatory program can serve as a credible signal of a company's superior capabilities related to the program's principles. Prior studies have concluded that a self-regulatory program that lack third-party certification cannot prevent adverse selection and therefore cannot serve as a credible signal (Darnall and Carmin, 2005; King and Lenox, 2000; Lenox and Nash, 2003; Rivera and de Leon, 2004) . We argue, however, that self-regulatory programs that instead feature scrutiny from civil society-by requiring participants to publicly commit to the program's principles-can, under certain conditions, mitigate adverse selection. By exploring institutional and organizational factors that support and enhance the impact of scrutiny, ours is the first study to find that such a program can sometimes serve as a credible signal.
Our research also contributes to the management literature that has applied signaling theory to a variety of other contexts. Several researchers have noted that the literature using signaling theory is mainly focused on ex ante signaling costs, such as the cost of achieving thirdparty certification, but largely ignores potential ex post penalty costs such as being vulnerable to lawsuits or reputation damage (Connelly et al., 2011: 61; Payne et al., 2013: 232) . Ours is among the first studies to examine whether the risk of a penalty, in the form of criticism from civil society, can effectively substitute for ex ante signaling costs. In what may be the closest study to 26 ours, Lin, Prabhala, and Viswanathan (2013) examine people seeking peer-to-peer loans and find that the number of online "friendships" a borrower possesses serves as a credible signal of her likelihood of defaulting on the loan. They theorize that more "friends" increases the risk of social stigma should the borrower default. In other words, this potential penalty cost prevents adverse selection. Our research goes beyond this analysis by applying the concept of ex post penalty costs to a business setting and by identifying several conditions under which the penalty risk is especially likely to make a signal credible.
Implications for managers
Self-regulatory programs that require third-party certification have been proposed as a supplemental governance mechanism for companies operating in institutional contexts with lax regulatory enforcement and little social pressure for corporate social responsibility (e.g., Christmann and Taylor, 2006) . Our study provides evidence that participation in a self-regulatory program that lacks such certification requirements, but instead features scrutiny from civil society, can provide a credible signal of superior capabilities when there is institutional support for such scrutiny. Our results therefore suggest that managers can screen suppliers in countries that provide institutional support for scrutiny based in part on which suppliers choose to participate in self-regulation programs featuring civil society scrutiny.
Furthermore, participation in self-regulatory programs that feature civil society scrutiny might provide a better signal of superior capabilities than participation in programs requiring third-party certification does. In his seminal "Job Market Signaling" paper, Spence (1973) notes that the cost of an education might prevent highly capable people from earning a degree.
Similarly, third-party certification fees can be substantial (e.g., Darnall and Edwards, 2006 ) and might prevent highly capable companies from pursuing certification. Self-regulatory programs that instead feature civil society scrutiny lack such certification costs that are unrelated to the quality of the company's capabilities and thus do not similarly dissuade highly capable companies from participating.
Limitations and future work
Our work has several limitations. Because we lack a precise measure of a company's capabilities to manage environmental risks and impact, we instead used the quality of the company's environmental disclosures. While the number of environmental accidents might have provided a better proxy, we lack such a measure for our global sample, which spans 44 countries. The accounting literature has compellingly demonstrated that companies with better disclosures are also more capable of managing environmental risks (Blacconiere and Northcut, 1997; Blacconiere and Patten, 1994) and impacts (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, and Hughes, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008) . Of course, this prompts a second concern that rather than using participation in a self-regulatory program as a signal of capabilities to manage environmental risks and impacts, stakeholders could instead simply assess each company's environmental disclosures. We argue that because environmental disclosures can be difficult to comprehend, companies often need a simpler means-such as participation in a self-regulatory program-to convey such information.
We theorize that the threat of scrutiny from civil society can, under certain conditions, be a sufficient cost to companies with inferior capabilities to keep them from participating in programs featuring such scrutiny. However, while the requirement to make a public commitment to program principles is a feature of many self-regulatory programs featuring such scrutiny- industry association, or a multi-stakeholder consortium. These factors might influence the extent to which civil society scrutinizes the program's participants. Furthermore, the Global Compact is a particularly large and well-known self-regulatory program launched and operated by an unusually prominent organization; it has also attracted considerable criticism from researchers, the media, and activists (e.g., Bigge, 2004; Deva, 2006; Nolan, 2005; Waddock and McIntosh, 2011) . Future research is needed to confirm how different programs might differ in the degree to which participation serve as a credible signal.
Another question of generalizability arises from our data being constrained to relatively large, publicly listed companies, whereas many self-regulatory programs also attract relatively small and privately held companies. In terms of firm size, we find that smaller companies with inferior capabilities to manage environmental risks and impacts are especially deterred from participating in a self-regulatory program that features scrutiny from civil society, which we attribute to the greater risk that criticism would damage their reputations. This suggests that our results might also apply to even smaller companies that were not included in our analysis. Very small companies, however, might attract no additional scrutiny at all upon joining a selfregulatory program, which would imply that the mechanisms driving our results might not apply to them. It also remains unclear whether our results apply to private companies, which are not subject to important sources of institutional pressure such as investors and socially-responsibleinvestment rating agencies. Upon joining self-regulatory programs featuring scrutiny from civil society, private companies might not experience a sufficient increase in scrutiny to prevent adverse selection. Future work is therefore needed on the extent to which our hypothesized relationships apply to smaller companies and privately held companies.
Finally, Etzion and Pe'er (2014) argue that the credibility of a signaling mechanism can change over time because the conditions that influence its costs and benefits can change. It is therefore plausible that the signaling credibility of the Global Compact might change over time.
Because our data on the quality of companies' environmental disclosures is limited to the period with over 10,000 companies participating (Rasche, Waddock, and McIntosh, 2013) . This rapid growth might be overwhelming civil society's ability to scrutinize participants, which could gradually reduce the program's signaling credibility.
Conclusion
Our study aimed to reveal the circumstances under which self-regulatory programs that lack third-party certification requirements, but instead require participants to publicly commit to the program's principles, can still serve as a credible signal. We extend theory of signaling mechanisms in the management literature by demonstrating how the threat of a penalty, in the form of criticism from civil society, can prevent companies with inferior capabilities to manage environmental risks and impacts from participating in a self-regulatory program featuring such scrutiny. This table reports the actual means and standard deviations, but in most cases standardized variables are used for the analysis, as indicated in Table 4 . 
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Appendix -1
Appendix. An alternative measure of civil society scrutiny
To test H1, we measure civil society scrutiny as the number of global NGO participants in the Global Compact in each company's headquarters country in a given year. This approach is predicated on the assumption that it is easier for NGOs to access information on domestic companies and to disseminate information to domestic stakeholders that includes communities, the media, and regulators. However, NGOs are increasingly using the Internet to obtain and disseminate information across national boundaries. For example, Greenpeace is headquartered in the Netherlands, but the organization targets companies all over the world via their websites and blogs. We use a country's number of Internet users as an alternative measure of civil society scrutiny. This metric proxies for the extent to which a company's stakeholders discover that it was criticized for having failed to uphold the Global Compact's principles. From the World Bank, we obtained data on the number of Internet users per 100 people, which it collects from the International Telecommunication Union. This number includes people who have Internet access at home, work, or school.
31 Table A1 reports results that use this alternative metric to test H2. As in Model 2 in Table   4 , the positive significant coefficient on this interaction term (β = 0.10; p = 0.05) indicates that companies with higher-quality disclosures are especially likely to participate when headquartered in countries with greater Internet usage. Thus, Global Compact participation in this institutional context provides a more credible signal of a company's capability to manage environmental risks and impacts.
31 Data on Internet users from the World Bank can be accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2. Accessed May 2015.
Appendix -2 Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by country in brackets. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. † indicates variables that are standardized. ◊ indicates standardized within each country. Environmental damage and sales are winsorized (top-coded) at the top-one-percent level to account for outliers. All models also include a dummy variable denoting the 332 instances in which missing values of UN support were recoded to 0.
